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CASE COMMENTS
CIVIL RIGHTS-EMPLOYMENT TESTING AND
JOB PERFORMANCE

Black employees brought a class action challenging the validity
of the Duke Power Company's use of general intelligence and ability
tests. The tests were given to determine the promotion eligibility of
those employees without a high school education.' These employees
alleged racial discrimination 2 in the use of these tests for promotion
from the laborer classification. Plaintiffs asserted the 1964 Civil

Rights Act required that such tests must satisfy the concept of job
relatedness.3 Held, relief granted in part, denied in part. In regard
to plaintiffs hired prior to the adoption of the promotion policy, the
educational requirement could not preclude promotion.4 Employees
hired after the adoption of the educational standard were subjected
to its requirements. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th
Cir. 1970), rev'd, 39 U.S.L.W. 4317 (U.S. March 8, 1971).'

1In 1955, the defendant company instituted a new hiring and promotion
policy which established the requirement of a high school education or its
equivalent. The "equivalent" was determined by the use of standardized tests;
specifically, the Wonderlic General Intelligence Test and the Bennett Mechanical AA Test. It was undisputed that these tests were the equivalent of a high
school education. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1228-1229
(4th Cir. 1970).
2 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964).
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall
not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply
different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or
merit system, or a system which measures earnings by quantity or
quality of production or to employees who work in different locations, provided that such differences are not the result of an intention
to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin, nor shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to give and to act upon the results of any professionally
developed ability tests provided that such test, its administration or
action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in
determining the amount of the wages or compensation paid or to
be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is
authorized by the provisions of Section 206(d) of Title 29.
3 Section 1607.4 of the revised Guidelines on Employment Testing states
a test is job-related if its contents measure job performance potential.
4 Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968), was
one of the first cases to challenge the legality of promotion requirements
under Title VII. The court held "that Congress did not intend to freeze an
entire generation of Negro employees into discriminatory patterns that
existed
before the act." Id. at 516.
5
See note 37 infra.
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Although the Griggs majority and dissenting opinions agreed
that the 1964 Civil Rights Act relieved the present effects of past
discrimination, the opinions differed over the proper margin of business purpose necessary to justify the utilization of the challenged
promotion requirement. The majority ruled the proper margin was
satisfied with the demonstration of a legitimate business purpose
while the dissent urged the standard of job relatedness. The court's
disagreement was predicated on the proper interpretation of section
703(h) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.' Both opinions attributed
Congress' adoption of this Section as a reaction to a hearing examiner's finding for the Illinois Fair Employment Practice Commission.! Both stated this commission had concluded a pre-employment
general intelligence test given to a black applicant denied equal
employment opportunity because blacks were a "culturally deprived"
group.' The commission's decision was generally assumed to mean
that such tests were barred even if business need required their use.9
Although both opinions implied section 703(h) was formulated to
preclude Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)' 0
rulings in accord with this commission decision, review of the sec-

tion's legislative history produced different interpretations." The
dissent supported the EEOC concept of 703 (h)-that testing should
be job related.' 2 The majority concluded its investigation of legislative history precluded the adoption of the EEOC position; rather,
section 703 (h) was added to sanction the validity of nondiscriminatory professionally developed ability tests." However, the court
emphasized that this holding was not to be interpreted as an approval
of any educational or testing standard-such a standard's validity
under the 1964 Civil Rights Act must be determined by the presence
of a genuine business purpose.'" In Griggs, this purpose was established by Duke's expert testimony, which concluded a high school
education was necessary to perform duties in the skilled classifica6

See note 2 supra.

Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1234, 1242 (4th Cir. 1970).
The citation for the commission's finding is Myart v. Motorola, Inc., 110 Cong.
Rec. 5662-64 (1964), rev'd, Motorola, Inc. v. Ill. Fair Employment Practices
Comm'n., 34 Ill.2d 266, 215 N.E.2d 286 (1966).
8 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1234 (4th Cir. 1970).
9 Id. at 1242 (dissenting opinion).
1 The E.E.O.C. is charged with administering and implementing Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
,"Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1234, 1242 (4th Cir. 1970).
12 Id. at 1243.
13d.
at 1234.
' 4 1d. at 1235.
7
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tions.
However, the dissent condemned the utilization of the
"genuine business purpose" standard as vulnerable to discriminatory
application:
For them [the majority], the crucial inquiry is not whether the Company can establish business need, but whether
it had a bad motive or has designed its tests with the conscious purpose to discriminate against blacks. Thus the
majority stresses that the standards were adopted in 1955
when overt discrimination was the general rule, and hence
the new policy was obviously not meant to accomplish that
end. But this is no answer.
A man who is turned down for a job does not care
whether it was because the employer did not like his skin
color or because, although the employer professed impartiality, procedures were used which had the effect of discriminating against the applicant's race. Likewise irrelevant
to Title VII is the state of mind of an employer whose policy, in practice, effects discrimination. The law will not
tolerate unnecessarily harsh treatment of Negroes even
though an employer does not plan this result. The use of
criteria that are not backed by valid and corrobrated business needs cannot be allowed, regardless of subjective in6
tent.'
Stressing the necessity of job relatedness, the Griggs dissent
stated the tests should appraise those necessary job skills which an
employee would be expected to perform. 7 The dissent urged that
the critical inquiry in testing was business necessity. "There can be
no legitimate business purpose apart from business need; and where
no business need is shown, claims to business purpose evaporate."'"
'The dissent found this statement "unsubstantiated". "The testimony
does establish that the tests are the equivalent or a suitable substitute for a
high school education, but there is an utter failure to establish that they
sufficiently measure the capacity of the employee to perform any of the jobs
in the inside departments." Id. at 1245.
' 6 1d. at 1246. The dissent noted that Duke was inconsistent in the
application of this requirement because it was not invoked in the promotion
of those already situated in the inside departments. Id.
171d. at 1240. The company did not conduct any studies to determine
whether the challenged requirements measured an employee's ability to
perform jobs in the inside departments. Id. at 1231.
,8Id.at 1246.
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In Arrington v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authority,19 plaintiffs charged that defendant's practice of offering employment to
individuals according to test performance violated both the Civil
Rights Acts of 1870 and 1872.0 In Arrington, the court held the
practice of offering employment in order of performance on general
aptitude tests was discriminatory in the absence of evidence demon-

strating the relevance of these tests to job tasks. The court stated:
[u]sing an aptitude test to determine eligibility for employment or the order of hiring is certainly justified if
there is a relationship between the aptitude tests and the
demands of the work to be done.... However, if there is

no demonstrated correlation between scores on an aptitude
test and ability to perform well on a particular job, the use
of the tests in determining who or when one gets hired
makes little business sense.2'
But a hiring practice related to ability to perform is not itself
unfair even if it means disadvantaged minorities are affected ad22
versely.
In rejecting the EEOC job relatedness guideline,"' the majority
cited International Chem. Workers v. PlantersMfg Co.,24 which held
EEOC interpretations are not conclusive on the courts. From this
premise the court reasoned the rejection of the EEOC interpretations was necessitated when those guidelines were contrary to "compelling legislative history." "We cannot agree with plaintiff's contention that such an interpretation by EEOC should be upheld where,
as here, it is clearly contrary to compelling legislative history and,
as will be shown, the legislative history of § 703 (h) will not support
the view that a 'professionally developed ability test must be job
related'."" With this language, the Griggs majority may have enun19 306 F. Supp. 1355 (D. Mass. 1969). See also Penn v. Stump, 308
F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
20 Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1870); Civil Rights Act
of 1872, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1872).
21 Arrington v. Massachusetts, Bay Transp. Authority, 306 F. Supp. 1355,
1358 (D. Mass. 1969).
22 United States v. H. K. Porter Co., 296 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ala. 1968).
23 Contra, Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United
States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969); Dobbins v. Local 212, IBEW, 292
F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968). In these cases the courts have adopted EEOC
guidelines. The Guidelines referred to by the court in Griggs can be found
in CCH Empl. Prac. Guide, para. 16, 904 at 7319. The Guidelines were
revised in July, 1970.
24 259 F. Supp. 365, 366 (N.D. Miss. 1966).
25 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1234 (4th Cir. 1970).
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ciated a new test for determining the acceptance of administrative
agency interpretations. Yet, if administrative interpretations must be

"clearly contrary to compelling legislative history" before adoption
may be denied, then perhaps this test was not satisfied since the
decision itself formulated two reasonable alternative constructions of
section 703 (h).
Generally, administrative agency interpretations are not binding
on courts; nevertheless, they are accorded great weight.26 The United
States Supreme Court stated in Udall v. TallmarY that it shows
great deference to the interpretation given the statute by the agency
charged with its administration.2" In Udall the Supreme Court stated
that when the construction of an administrative regulation is involved
9 The
rather than a statute, deference is even more appropriate.
court in Griggs was concerned not with an administrative interpretation of a regulation but with the agency's interpretation of the
statute. In Griggs the dissent urged it was settled doctrine that the
commission's interpretation be accepted."
The dissent in Griggs also felt the majority opinion placed the
Fourth Circuit in conflict with the Fifth Circuit." In a Fifth Circuit
case, Local 189, United Papermak. & Paperwork. v. United States,"2
plaintiffs brought suit against employer and union to set aside jobseniority in any form as discriminatory. The court held the present
seniority system should be replaced by a system whereby no em26
See, e.g., Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235
(5th Cir. 1969); Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 284 F. Supp. 74, 78
(N.D.2 Inc. 1968).
7 380 U.S. 1 (1965).
28
1d. at 16. See also, Unemployment Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143,
Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 580, 583 (1930).
153 (1946);
29
380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
30 420 F.2d at 1240-41. The dissent cited the following to support this
position:
When faced with a problem of statutory construction, this
Court shows great deference to the interpretation given the statute
by the officers or agency charged with its administration. 'To sustain
the Commission's application of this statutory term, we need not
find that its construction is the only reasonable one, or even that
it is the result we would have reached had the question arisen in the
first instance in judicial proceedings.' Unemployment Compensation
Commission of Territory of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153
(1946) .... Particularly is this respect due when the administrative
practice at stake 'involves a contemporaneous construction of a
statute by the men charged with the responsibility of setting its
machinery in motion; of making the parts work efficiently and
smoothly while they are yet untried and new'. Power Reactor
Development Co. v. Electricians, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961).
31

32

420 F.2d at 1237.

416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969).
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ployee could have a right to a job he could not perform properly.3"
The primary consideration in Griggs was "the use of allegedly
objective employment criteria resulting in denial to Negroes of jobs
for which they are potentially qualified. ' 4
"The depressed employment position of black Americans is the
master problem in the battle against discrimination and poverty.""5
A practice of testing in which blacks demonstrate a constant deficiency in performance invites the court to scrutinize the effects and
purposes of the tests. 6 The Griggs decision reflects a reasonable
difference of opinion regarding the margin of business purpose necessary to sanction the use of such tests."
Henry C. Bowen
33

34

Id. at 981.

Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1237 (4th Cir. 1970)
(dissenting opinion).
35 Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment
Laws:
A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82
HAiv. L. REv. 1598 (1969).
Commenting on the Griggs decision at the federal district court level
[292 F. Supp. 243 (M.D. N.C. 1968)], Cooper and Sobol stated that the
EEOC interpretation of the Act is entitled to great weight. "It was arrived
at after consultation with a panel of testing experts and an evaluation of the
implications of alternative interpretations. These are precisely the considerations which justify judicial deference to the interpretations of an administrative agency." Id. at 1654.
See generally Gould, Seniority and the Black Worker: Reflections on
Quarles and its Implications, 47 TEXAs L. REv. 1039 (1969); Blumorsen,
Seniority and Equal Employment Opportunity: A Glimmer of Hope, 23 RTrr.
L. REv. 268 (1969); Kovarsky, Some Social and Legal Aspects of Testing
Under the Civil Rights Act, 15 How. L.J. 227 (1969); Jenkins, A Study of
FederalEfforts to End Job Bias: A History, A Status Report, and A Prognosis,
14 How. L.J. 259 (1968); Gould, Employment Security, Seniority and Race:
The Role of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 13, How. L.J.
1 (1967); Note, Civil Rights Racially Discriminatory Employment Practices
Under Title VII, 46 N.C. L. REv. 891 (1968); Note, Title VII, Seniority
Discrimination and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HAv. L. REv. 1260 (1967).
36 "The reason for this deficiency in performance has not been related
to any lack of innate intelligence but rather primarily to the socio-economic
realities of a history of economic, cultural, and educational deprivation to
which the black race has been subject." Arrington v. Massachusetts Bay
Transp. Authority, 306 F. Supp. 1355, 1358 (D. Mass. 1969).
37 Subsequent to the writing of this comment, the United States Supreme
Court rejected the "genuine business purpose" standard of the Griggs majority and held:
(f)rom the sum of the legislative history relevant in this case, the
conclusion is inescapable that the EEOC's construction of 703(h) to
require that employment tests be job-related comports with congressional intent ....
What Congress has forbidden is giving these
devices and mechanisms controlling force unless they are demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance . . . . What
Congress has commanded is that any tests used must measure the
person for the job and not in the abstract.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 39 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4321, (U.S. March 8, 1971).
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